Global Policy Forum

By John G. Ruggie

For eight long and trying years, the international community has been struggling to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction. But to date nothing -- neither force nor diplomacy -- has persuaded Iraq to come into full compliance with all its obligations under Security Council resolutions. As the impasse continues, frustration, understandably, mounts. It was very much in evidence in recent press reports that the U.S. government might have used the U.N. Special Commission in Iraq (UNSCOM) to collect intelligence data in part for purposes that might not have been encompassed in UNSCOM's mandate. What should have been a sidebar to the story -- that unnamed individuals in the secretary general's office expressed concern -- for a time became its central focus. And Secretary General Kofi Annan himself came under criticism for not being tough enough on Iraq while being too tough on UNSCOM. These criticisms are devoid of merit, and debate over them detracts from the real issue: the need to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction as well as the means to deliver them. The secretary general has had one aim only: to help bring Iraq into compliance with the relevant demands of the Security Council. His preference for the use of diplomatic means, if feasible, has two sources. One is principled. The United Nations Charter prescribes peaceful means and permits force, as authorized by the Security Council, only where peaceful means fail. The second basis is pragmatic. The secretary general has repeatedly asked "morning after" questions about the use of force: Will it bring us closer to our common objectives, or will it make our already difficult task even more so? On his return from Baghdad last February, the secretary general readily acknowledged that force and diplomacy can work together effectively, when he credited the threat of allied force with boosting the success of his diplomatic initiative to open presidential sites in Iraq to weapons inspections for the first time ever. "No promises of peace and no policy of patience can be without limits," he added in a statement to the Security Council at the time. These are hardly the words of an appeaser, as some editorial pages have mischaracterized the secretary general. UNSCOM, the secretary general has pointed out on numerous occasions, has destroyed more of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction than all of Operation Desert Storm did. Its success has been the direct consequence of a Security Council determined to see its resolutions respected, coupled with the discipline and dedication of the men and women from nearly 40 countries who have served as weapons inspectors. And the secretary general has been fully supportive of UNSCOM's mission. Whatever differences the secretary general may have had with UNSCOM largely have been matters of style, not substance. On occasion, provocative remarks and indiscretions by UNSCOM personnel have permitted UNSCOM itself to become an issue of contention, both on the ground and in the Security Council. Such diversions have not helped UNSCOM's cause, but Iraq's, and the secretary general has consistently sought to curtail them. We do not yet know the full truth regarding the role of UNSCOM in intelligence gathering, as opposed to receiving, or the objectives for which that intelligence might have been used. New rumors, conjectures and spin appear daily. It is incontestable that UNSCOM required good intelligence to achieve its disarmament goals. But if the most far-reaching press allegations were to be borne out -- that UNSCOM data were used to select bombing targets for Operation Desert Fox or to aid in the overthrow of the government in Baghdad -- that could not be condoned by the United Nations. For the United Nations has no mandate to pursue or support these objectives, nor does UNSCOM. And the United Nations must be able to guarantee the impartiality and strictly technical nature of its future arms control and disarmament efforts, which could well take place in equally challenging circumstances. As we consider what the next steps should be, we must not lose sight of the core issues: satisfactorily concluding the disarmament phase of the U.N.'s work in Iraq and preventing any reconstitution of its weapons of mass destruction; ending the suffering of its people and reintegrating them into the international community; achieving stability in the gulf region and the Middle East as a whole; and ensuring the effectiveness of the U.N. as well as its multilateral arms control regimes. Those are the secretary general's goals. And they are shared by the international community. The task now is to devise creative and constructive ways to achieve them. The writer, formerly dean of international affairs at Columbia University, is an assistant secretary general of the United Nations. Copyright 1999 The Washington Post