I.  Introduction

1.  Growing attention has been paid to the issue of sanctions reform by the United Nations, governments, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as the human drama in Iraq has continued to unfold.  The stark reality of human suffering has demonstrated the immediate need to explore new ways for the Security Council and its sanctions committees to operate.  Discussion has crescendoed to the point that we are at today, attempting to discover the best ways to use sanctions to ensure their effectiveness in securing compliance to international standards of behavior by violators without contributing to or causing suffering within the civilian population of the target country.

2.  In truth, for MCC and many other NGOs, sanctions are morally ambiguous.  At times they have been used as a viable alternative to war.  But, as has been recently shown in Iraq, their effects on civilian populations can be comparable to that of war.  Measures must be taken to alleviate the human suffering caused by sanctions.  The Issue Paper Concerning The Sanctions Imposed by The Security Council and Practical Proposals to the Sanctions Committees for the Improvement of Their Work is a first step toward addressing this problem.

II.  Critique of the Paper and Proposals

3.  Overall, the paper and proposals are a good and honest attempt at addressing many of the humanitarian concerns related to sanctions.  We would like to address several areas in response to this proposal.

4.  The consideration of the humanitarian impact of sanctions should be more regularized into each committee's work.  As stated currently in paragraphs three and four of the paper and paragraphs nine and ten of the proposals, it appears that the Security Council and the sanctions committees are not required to take into account the humanitarian impacts of sanctions on a target country.  It should be required that sanctions committees  and the Security Council consider the humanitarian impacts of sanctions on the target country when sanctions are reviewed.  This should happen at least every ninety days.

5.  In his role as the head of the organization, the Secretary-General should be asked to provide at each review (every ninety days) a new report by his experts of the current humanitarian situation.  The committees should also hear the views of OCHA, OHCHR, UNICEF and any other UN or specialized agency conducting humanitarian operations within a target country.

6.  The ideas for relations with NGOs within the issue paper and proposals are indeed encouraging.  But they do not go far enough.  Once a year is not enough consultation to keep NGOs abreast of the latest political developments and to inform the committees adequately of NGO activities within the target country.  Visits by the chair of the sanctions committee to the target country to dialogue with UN agencies, specialized agencies, and NGOs would help to establish an on-the-ground working relationship which would aid communication between the political and humanitarian sides of any sanctions situation.  But NGOs must have access to all information and deliberations in order to be most effective in serving the civilian population of a target state.  Consultations should be held with NGOs in New York concurrently with regular meetings of the sanctions committees to review sanctions.  NGOs should be able to observe the committees' meetings and be invited to speak to the committee in particular areas of expertise as well.  We do warmly endorse the proposal that NGOs should be allowed to apply directly to the sanctions committees to obtain authorization to ship aid to target countries.

7.  The issue of the assessment of potential humanitarian impacts of sanctions before their imposition is a difficult one.  In paragraph six of the paper, the view is stated that this must not be done at the expense of the timely implementation of sanctions.  Indeed, this has been the main criticism expressed by many countries in regards to the assessment of potential impacts.  But the assessment must not be abandoned for political expediency.  Furthermore, many would argue that sanctions cannot be changed after their imposition because this may show political weakness.

8.  A possible solution to this would be, instead of imposing comprehensive sanctions immediately upon a country, the Security Council should develop a list of types of sanctions which can be imposed without an assessment of the potential humanitarian impacts, including arms embargoes and banning travel and freezing assets of the targeted leaders.  Any sanction which was not on the list would require a report from the Secretary-General assessing its potential humanitarian impact.  In some cases, these targeted sanctions would be all that is needed to resolve the situation.  Furthermore, the Security Council could make a general political statement condeming the particular behavior and declaring its intent to impose sanctions pending the report of the Secretary-General on the humanitarian impacts of sanctions on that country.  This method of work allows the Security Council to "do something" and not cause suffering within the target country.  Any kind of list which the Security Council would develop and could use quickly would require further consultation, with humanitarian UN agencies, specialized agencies, and NGOs to ensure that there are not unforseen humanitarian consequences.

9.  The Security Council can help itself also by ensuring the Secretariat has the necessary resources to produce a report of the potential effects of sanctions in a short period of time (ie., one week).  When sanctions are imposed quickly, the Security Council must remain flexible to change sanctions, by either changing their nature or temporarily suspending them,  if it is evident that there is a humanitarian emergency in the target country and based upon the Secretary General's report.

10.  The Security Council should study further the use of arms embargoes and targetted sanctions, with a view towards making them more effective.  Too often, countries subvert sanctions imposed by the Security Council in pursuit of their own policy objectives.  Rewards or punishments must be found to persuade all countries to abide by Security Council directives and actively enforce sanctions.

11.  Sanctions should have a definite expiration date.  Under the current working method, one permanent member can force the Security Council to maintain sanctions indefinitely by using or threatening to use its veto against the lifting of sanctions.  If, after a certain period of time, the Security Council still believes that sanctions are necessary, it can re-approve them.  This would send a very strong political message to the target country about Security Council unity which the current working method does not send.
 

III.  Additional Items for Consideration

12.  Exemptions are only mentioned in passing in the proposals.  More attention needs to be given to this issue.  Both material exemptions, such as food, medicine, and other humanitarian supplies, as well as organizational exemptions should be more closely considered.  In addition to UN and specialized agencies, NGOs should be exempt from sanctions so that they can do their work unhindered.  In order to manage this, a register of NGOs could be created, similar in style to the one which ECOSOC currently uses.  After a vigorous examination, an NGO could receive exempt status for a period of time (ie., four years).  This exemption would apply to any and all sanctions which are in effect during that period.  In the current context, this would mean that NGOs who are approved would be able to operate in and ship humanitarian goods to Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and other target countries and groups without restriction.  NGOs would be required to report every year on their operations within target countries.  Only humanitarian organizations would be allowed to obtain this status.  In addition to this, NGOs which are not exempt should be allowed to apply directly to the sanctions committees for authorization to ship goods to a target country.

13.  Another issue not addressed is the funding crisis and its effects on the response to humanitarian problems created by sanctions.  Countries must demonstrate more financial will.  In his report, Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations, Secretary-General Kofi Annan states that "...by 15 May 1998 the average response to the consolidated appeals issued by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for 1998 was only approximately 15 per cent."  This huge shortfall does not take into account the budgetary problems that exist for OCHA and other aid and development agencies which are funded by supplementary funding and not the regular budget.  In order to alleviate the negative effects of sanctions member states must demonstrate a much deeper financial commitment to the UN and to its appeals for aid.

14.  The post sanctions period was not addressed within the paper or proposals either.  The international community must be prepared to rebuild the country that it applied sanctions to.  Following an extended episode of sanctions, there will undoubtably be economic devastation.  This can cause the target country to despise the international community and breed resentment which can lead to conflict in the future.  By the international community publicly and financially pledging itself to the rebuilding of a devastated target country, it can prevent future conflict with that country. Guaranteed reconstruction aid following a period of sanctions would also provide a valuable incentive which could add to the effectiveness of sanctions.

IV.  Conclusion

15.  The paper and proposals represent a positive first step to integrated decision making within the Security Council.  By considering humanitarian as well as political and security concerns, the Security Council will work towards a "Culture of Peace," established on the bedrock of human rights and humanitarian principles.

16.  We appreciate the effort made to draw NGOs into the deliberations on this topic and look forward to continuing to work with the Security Council and the sanctions committees in the future.