By Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti
Mr. Chairman,
Although the so-called intermediate model is not Brazil's preferred option for reform of the Security Council, we understand your decision to hold an exchange of views on such model and thank you for convening the meeting.
As we have said in the past, one of the problems with the intermediate reform is terminological in nature. Delegations use terms such as "intermediate" and "intermediary" to mean different things. The result is a debate that gravely lacks in clarity. If today's meeting helps to better understand what delegations mean and where they stand on several aspects raised by such model, some progress will have been made.
For my delegation, "intermediate" and "intermediary" seem to refer to the status of the new members. In that sense, those terms convey the idea of a middle-of-the-road approach between the proposals of expansion of the Council in both categories and of expansion only in the category of non-permanent members.
If understood in the manner described above, the intermediate reform poses difficulties. The main one is that a meaningful reform of the Council will not come through the establishment of new non-permanent members only, as I have extensively explained in previous meetings. Notions such as "semi-permanent members", "extended seats" or "long-term seats" are but variations of the concept of non-permanency and would be equally flawed. In addition, the intermediate model seems too concerned with accommodating specific national interests and would only provide a simulacrum of reform that does not truly address the challenges before the Council. None of this is in the best interest of this Organization and its Members States.
Delegations might benefit from some clarification on the part of the proponents of the intermediate reform as to the ability of such model to fully achieve the objectives for Security Council reform agreed upon in the 2005 Outcome Document. Some of the aspects that they may wish to clarify are:
a) How would the Council become more diverse and therefore more representative of today's realities if its core membership remains intact?
b) The intermediate reform is essentially the same as the one adopted in 1963, which did not bring the change needed. Why would the same model produce a better result this time around?
c) How could three consecutive two-year mandates, five-year non-renewable mandates - or, for that matter, any time-limited mandates - empower non-permanent members to improve the way the Council works?
These questions go to the core of the problems we have to solve when devising a meaningful reform of the Security Council. There are no convincing answers to such questions. The only satisfactory response lies in a reform that provides for the expansion of the Security Council in both categories of members, with developing countries in both.
Mr. Chairman,
As we approach the end of the Session, I also wish to make a brief comment on the way forward. We must continue the intergovernmental negotiations so that we build upon what has been achieved so far and achieve concrete results. We rely on your leadership to guide us in this process.
Thank you.
