Picture Credit: UN Photo/Stuart Price |
What is to be done in a crisis like the genocide in Rwanda, when the international community seeks to stop the killing? Can nations, acting through the UN Security Council, fulfill a "responsibility to protect" innocent civilians? Or is such a doctrine just a Trojan horse for great power abuse?
When nations send their military forces into other nations' territory, it is rarely (if ever) for "humanitarian" purposes. They are typically pursuing their narrow national interest - grabbing territory, gaining geo-strategic advantage, or seizing control of precious natural resources. Leaders hope to win public support by describing such actions in terms of high moral purposes - bringing peace, justice, democracy and civilization to the affected area. In the era of colonialism, European governments all cynically insisted that they acted to promote such higher commitments - the "white man's burden," "la mission civilisatrice," and so on and so forth.
The appeal to higher moral purposes continues to infect the political discourse of the great powers. Today's "humanitarian intervention" is only the latest in this long tradition of political obfuscation. In 2003, the US-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq was labeled "humanitarian intervention" by UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.
Still, should intervention (even multilateral intervention, approved by the Security Council) be excluded in all circumstances?
This section looks at the issues and the fierce debate that has arisen within the United Nations about these "new approaches" to sovereignty and collective action.
GPF Reports
In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect (May 13, 2014)The full report is available for download. "In whose name? A critical view on the Responsibility to Protect” by Lou Pingeot and Wolfgang Obenland provides an overview of the history and content of R2P, its positive contributions and its flaws. It concludes that R2P does not give a satisfying answer to the key question it is supposed to address: how best to prevent and, if prevention fails, respond to large-scale human rights violations and killings? The concept is particularly dangerous as it amalgamates arguments and proposals, mixing uncontroversial and widely accepted notions (that states have a responsibility towards their citizens) with more dubious claims (that military intervention is an appropriate tool to protect civilians). Rather than building a last resort option – military intervention – for when all else fails, there is a dire need to devote attention and energy to prevention and to ensuring that the international system does not fail to begin with. Existing legal instruments and institutions for crisis prevention and management fulfill many of the functions of R2P without undermining the principles of peaceful dispute settlement or the equal sovereignty of states. The report ends with an overview of alternatives that deserve more reflection and action. In whose name? is available for download. |
|
Report |
UN Documents
Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response (July 25, 2012)
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's 2012 report focuses on R2P's "third pillar" and the potential use of force authorized under the doctrine.
Responsibility While Protecting: elements for the development and promotion of a concept (November 11, 2011)
The "Responsibility While Protecting" is a Brazilian initative meant to respond to the BRIC's concern about potential abuses of R2P for military interventions. It sets a set of principles to supervise Security Council's mandates under R2P as well as better monitoring mechanisms.
The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (June 27, 2011)
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's 2011 report focuses on the necessity for R2P to incorporate a regional dimension in order to be better accepted internationally.
Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect
(July 14, 2010)
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon's 2010 report focuses on the prevention mechanisms of genocide and crimes against humanity as part of R2P.
Implementing The Responsibility to Protect (January 12, 2009)
Embracing the "Responsibility to Protect:" A Repertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims (July 2008)
Excerpt of the Millennium+5 Outcome Document (September 15, 2005)
Excerpt of Kofi Annan's Report on UN Reform: In Larger Freedom (March 21, 2005)
Excerpt of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (December 2, 2004)
The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001)
The final report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) introduced the concept of common "responsibility to protect" in cases of genocides, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. This ICISS report charts the evolution of "sovereignty as responsibility" and attempts to develop consistent, credible and enforceable standards to guide state and intergovernmental practice on humanitarian intervention.
Articles
2013
Mali: Old Wine in New Bottles? (March 18, 2013)
The French government attempted to justify its military intervention in Mali on humanitarian and security grounds. Francois Hollande’s government argued that the Islamist forces in Mali represented an intolerable threat to the human rights of Malian citizens as well as the security of West Africa and Europe. Despite its public relations efforts, the French government has not been able to avoid accusations of neocolonialism. Some have argued France has failed to abjure its outmoded paternalistic-colonial tendencies, while other critics suggest more immediate economic concerns motivated the intervention. Regardless of the actual reason for the campaign, France seems unwilling or unable to extricate its contemporary foreign policies from its colonial legacy. (Think Africa Press)
The Last Thing Syrians Need is More Arms Going to Either Side (March 4, 2013)
The UK government has recently expressed increased interest in providing material aid to anti-Assad forces in Syria. Charles Glass argues that such a policy is only likely to contribute to a worsening of the humanitarian situation in the country without providing a resolution to the civil war. Despite expressing a desire for peace in Syria, western governments including the UK have consistently opposed the Assad government, and would therefore have little credibility as mediators in the conflict. The Russian government, on the other hand, has been more sympathetic to the Assad government. Glass argues that, if humanitarian concerns are actually prioritized, diplomatic efforts could more effectively be channeled into pursuing an agreement with Russia to prevent the importation of arms for any side of the conflict. (Guardian)
Humanitarian Groups Warn Against Direct Aid to Syrian Rebels (February 27, 2013)
The US is strongly considering providing direct humanitarian assistance to favored opposition groups in Syria. Humanitarian aid organizations are expressing deep concerns about this strategy because their ability to be granted access to conflict situations relies heavily on their political neutrality and strict agenda of responding to humanitarian needs alone. If the US plans go ahead, the Assad government may not only restrict access, but perceive aid agencies as a front for a US military agenda. This has multiple consequences. Humanitarian aid agencies could be blocked from entry, or even become military targets themselves. Also, if aid is selectively given to some groups over others, the aid itself can become a source of conflict, thus fostering more violence. Regardless of political affiliation, children in need of food should be given assistance. This is the principle of humanitarian aid, which can be damaged beyond repair in a situation like Syria, if its apolitical reputation is tarnished by intervening powers. (UN Dispatch)
Mali: The Worst is Yet to Come (February 20, 2013)
The recent French intervention in Mali was successful in repelling the Islamist fighters who had previously established control over much of the country. While this seems to be an indication of the operation’s success, observers are concerned that the conflict may be transforming rather than simply ending. While insurgents no longer control northern Mali, and are not in a position to invade the capital Bamako, there are some initial indications that tactics of asymmetric warfare including suicide bombing may precipitate a more protracted conflict. So long as the underlying causes of conflict remain, violence in Mali will likely continue, even if French intervention has stemmed the direct military threat of an insurgency. (Guardian)
Hate Obama's Drone War? (February 14, 2013)
The Obama administration has recently been the subject of criticism for its controversial use of drones. Professor Rosa Brooks argues that the administration’s use of drones can be associated with an eroding commitment to sovereignty in international affairs. Though human rights activists are some of the most vocal critics of the Obama administration’s drone program, Brooks argues that some of these same critics have contributed to the erosion of sovereignty through their support for the responsibility to protect doctrine. Ultimately, the US drone program is predicated on a flexible interpretation of sovereignty, a concept that has had its strictures attenuated by the proponents of humanitarian intervention. (Foreign Policy)
The Intervention Trap (February 7, 2013)
The French intervention in Mali was explained by French authorities and their international allies as a necessary measure to combat a potential terrorist threat and preserve Mali’s territorial integrity. Professor Olivier Roy argues that these two objectives are not necessarily complementary, and so long as combatants in the conflict are treated as “Islamic terrorists”, the goal of establishing stability and territorial integrity in Mali will prove to be elusive. The conflict in Mali is fundamentally grounded in nationalist grievances and aims which have been co-opted by relatively marginal religious extremists. Roy contends that extremist groups endeavor to entice western intervention in order to transform nationalist conflicts into confrontations with the west. Ultimately, if western powers are truly interested in political stability, they must avoid falling into this “intervention trap” and encourage negotiated resolutions to nationalist demands. (New Statesmen)
Responsibility to Protect is a Power Play (January 25, 2013)
The recent French operation in Mali has reinvigorated debates over humanitarian intervention. In this article, independent scholar Diane Johnstone argues that the concept and language of genocide is being appropriated to justify interventionist policies by major powers. Johnstone is concerned that the obviously commendable and uncontroversial desire to prevent genocide has provided a pretext for great power interference in the affairs of smaller states. She also argues that the responsibility to protect undermines the perception that war is an atrocity in itself, and turns war into a legitimate tool for atrocity-prevention. (Minneapolis Star Tribune)
The War in Libya Was Seen as a Success, Now Here We Are Engaging with the Blowback in Mali (January 13, 2013)
2012
Mali: West Africa’s Gate to Chaos, Intervention (December 18, 2012)
The Humanitarian Fallout of a Military Intervention in Mali (December 14, 2012)
Rice: French Plan for Mali Intervention is 'Crap' (December 11, 2012)
Following the unexpected ouster of Mali’s transitional Prime Minister, members of the Security Council are determined to launch a military intervention in North Mali. Yet, the shape of such military action remains unclear as France and the United States are divided on the right strategy to adopt. France, South Africa, India, and other Council members favors the adoption of a single Security Council resolution authorizing a foreign intervention force by the end of 2012. France promotes a "two track" approach - promoting a democratic political transition while training Malian security forces to conduct offensive military operations. Skeptical of the capacity of the 3,300 Western African troops to oust the rebels from North Mali, the US promotes a longer-term “multifaceted strategy” to intervene in Mali, including political, humanitarian, environmental, and military pieces, as well as a greater role for its counterterrorism regional allies, mainly Algeria. (Foreign Policy)
Military Intervention in Mali Could Begin in Early 2013 (December 5, 2012)
On December 11, 2012, Malian President Cheick Mobido Diarra was arrested by soldiers and announced his resignation. The French government immediately called for a new government and a military intervention, arguing that that "these developments underline the need for the rapid deployment of an African stabilization force.” Despite warnings from humanitarian organizations and recent negotiations between the government and rebels, Western powers and their African allies are still promoting the military option. Alassane Ouattara, President of Ivory Coast and chair of ECOWAS, has declared that a UN-mandated African force is now ready to lead a military intervention in Mali as early as “the first quarter” of 2013. Yet, the resignation of Mali’s president will certainly deepen the “total confusion” about an international intervention that was decried by Chad’s President Deby. (Associated Press)
The Long War Reaches Mali (December 5, 2012)
Western powers have recently switched the focus of their “war on terror” strategy from Yemen to Mali. They are increasingly funding “counter-terrorism” programs in the country and , bilateral economic aid and emergency humanitarian assistance. North Mali is now described as a safe haven for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and a UN-backed military intervention seems more likely. In this article, Tom Hayden recalls that Western powers’ “main economic interest in Mali is in its gold mines,” and that several so-called humanitarian interventions of Western powers have resulted in pushing armed groups “into new territory with angry, restless and anti-Western Muslim populations.” (Huffington Post)
ECOWAS to Send Troops to Mali (November 12, 2012)
In spite of repeated warnings from aid workers, humanitarian NGOs and UN officials about the devastating humanitarian cost of an intervention in North Mali, the military option now seems inevitable. After holding an emergency summit with military experts from the UN, Europe, the African Union, and member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have agreed to send 3,300 troops in North Mali, in addition to around 5,000 Malian troops involved in the operations. While such intervention is being promoted as an African initiative, it is worth mentioning that Western powers’ assistance will be crucial, especially in terms of air power, military planning and intelligence. (BusinessDay)
Military Action in Mali will have Humanitarian Cost: ICRC (November 6, 2012)
Security Council Resolution 2071 requested a detailed plan for an international military intervention in North Mali. Such involvement would most likely be conducted by troops provided by ECOWAS members with the support of Western powers. Yet, Peter Maurer, President of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), criticizes the fact that "there is a lot of talk on how to 'liberate' the north, how to reconquer the north, but there is little consideration of what the humanitarian impact of whatever scenario would be." The potential humanitarian cost of such military operations would aggravate an already worrying situation in the Sahel by further limiting access for aid workers, threatening food security, and creating more refugees and internally displaced persons and in the region. (Reuters)
The Responsibility to Protect: What is the Basis for the Emerging Norm of R2P? (November 6, 2012)
The United Nations advocates the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), a controversial doctrine related to military interventions. Yet many fundamental practical questions remain unanswered and "no-one seems sure of what R2P even is." Practically, there is no clearly defined legal status, set of implementing mechanisms, and monitoring bodies limiting potential for abuses, as well as "no consensus on what actions R2P actually legitimates, nor by whom or when." In fact, Adam Branch argues that "it is precisely R2P's indeterminacy that makes it so popular today," as countries have the flexibility to "protect" according to their will and without worrying about their need to be accountable. Branch explains how this lack of conceptual clarity is particularly worrying for the African continent, where three-quarters of the crises in which R2P has been invoked or applied. Ultimately, R2P engenders a divide between Western "protectors" and African states, whose legitimacy and sovereignty are to be judged by the "international community". But it is also increasingly segmenting Africa itself as countries have to choose on which "side" they stand. (Think Africa Press)
Mali, and the Next War (November 1, 2012)
An intervention seems more and more unavoidable in North Mali. Western powers – mainly France and the US – are pushing to gain consensus over a military operation against radical Islamist rule across most of northern Mali. The justification provided is that the region “has the potential to be as much a locus for al-Qaida-related movements as Pakistan in the early 2000s.” US, France and other Western powers have refused to send troops on the ground and will rather rely on troops provided by members of ECOWAS. However, the West will certainly be directly involved by heavily backing up regional troops and setting up what Paul Rogers describes as “a ‘shadow war’ involving drones, special forces and private military contractors.” There is no doubt that another military involvement by the West in a Muslim country “is good news for an evolving al-Qaida movement” that will continue gaining in popularity across the Muslim world. (Open Democracy)
In the Footsteps of Hammarskjöld: the United Nations and Interventions for Security and Development (November 2012)
This report brings an interesting perspective on the interventionist role of the UN from Dag Hammarskjöld’s legacy to the emergence of a “culture of protection” as recently incarnated by R2P. Henning Melber sheds light on the rhetoric of Western moral obligation to intervene, which engendered an “increasingly explicit linkage of the security/military agenda and the humanitarian agenda.” While he does not reject the doctrine, Melber warn about the risks of “too uncritically accepting the notions as free of interest by those who promote them.” As for its application, he wisely recalls that “foreign intervention is neither a guarantee to protect humans from further atrocities, nor a secure point of departure for peaceful sustainable nation building.” One major problem is that the R2P doctrine is now widely applied at the UN despite a clear lack of standards to apply it, which makes it impossible “to reach a factually based conclusion about whether an intervention reduced bloodshed or increased the number of victims.” (Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation)
Clinton Presses Algeria on Mali Intervention Plan (October 29, 2012)
As it has been the case with Libya a year ago, the US plays a prudent and discreet role in the conception of a military intervention in Northern Mali, letting France at the forefront. However, Washington has made clear that its overriding concern is to root Al-Qaeda out of the region, leading Hillary Clinton to declare that “counter-terror efforts in Mali could not wait for a political resolution to Mali's problems.” Indeed, despite calls for diplomatic mediation in Mali, the UN and Western powers have not made any serious efforts to come to a political solution and have instead adopted Resolution 2071 to authorize an African-backed intervention. This explains why the US is putting pressure on Algeria, the most influential power in the region, to support an intervention. While it seems that Algeria has "tacitly" agreed to military action, the country has always expressed its suspicion regarding a foreign interference in the region, fearing that it would push fleeing Al-Qaeda members and Tuareg refugees across its southern border. (Reuters)
Military Intervention in Mali: A Dangerous Idea With Too Much Support (October 17, 2012)
On October 12, the Security Council adopted a resolution opening the door for military intervention against rebels in North Mali. While Western powers justify their call for intervention on the basis of the worsening humanitarian crisis in the Sahel, Simon Allison points out that the determining factors are rather the presence of al-Qaeda in North Mali – which sets the conflict on the global agenda of the “War on Terror” - and the low risk involved for major powers. In fact, a military intervention would be led by ECOWAS’ forces and the countries calling for such action would not have to send their own troops on the battlefield. Ultimately, the Security Council’s resolution indicates to what extend a military intervention would be beneficent for everyone “except, perhaps, Mali and the region as a whole,” which would be even more destabilized. (Guardian)
Security Council Gives Green Light to Send Foreign Military Trainers to Mali (October 12, 2012)
The option of a military intervention against Tuareg rebels and Islamic militants groups in Mali’s northern territories seems more plausible. On Friday October 12, the UN Security Council agreed on a resolution that provides an open-ended invitation to outside powers to send military trainers to Mali. While Resolution 2071 does not explicitly call for immediate military action, it expresses the council's "readiness" to authorize a full-fledged intervention. Colum Lynch argues that it actually “contains a lot of elements that will immediately deepen the role of outside powers in Mali and pave the way for a future intervention.” The question remains whether an external military intervention can be conducted without the collaboration of a stable government in Bamako. Will this really stabilize the country or rather amplify the food crisis, increase the number of internally displaced persons and restrict access to genuine humanitarian relief? (Foreign Policy)
The Bicycle Theory of International Diplomacy Drives Mali Debate into Slow Motion (October 8, 2012)
On the occasion of the UN 67th General Assembly, France’s Francois Hollande declared that "there is no time to lose" in dealing with North Mali. France’s call for a U.N.-backed African intervention force against Islamist rebels and Tuareg secessionists in North Mali seems broadly popular within the Security Council and ECOWAS. Yet, Colum Lynch recalls that “the effort to muster a force has been stalled by a range of factors.” Not only does resistance remain in Mali, where an intervention is generally seen as external interference, but plans for such military interventions remain unclear. Not to mention that, while members of ECOWAS support such initiative, Mali’s direct neighbors are afraid of the potential destabilizing spillover effects of a military campaign. (Foreign Policy)
The Diary of a Former Sanctions Buster (October 2, 2012)
Promoters of the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) often defend the doctrine by arguing that many non-violent prior steps, such as sanctions, can precede military interventions. Jérôme Tubiana, who was in charge of monitoring the UN Security Council’s “list of individuals subject to sanctions” in Darfur, severely criticizes the implementation mechanisms of such sanctions. Not only are the “suspects” not consulted or even informed that they are part of such lists, but by dismissing key players of the conflict from mediation efforts, “the sanctions are endangering the peace process, which should be the UN's priority.” To him, “no matter that the system is inefficient, unfair or even damaging for peace, what matters is hiding the international community's deep divisions and maintaining the illusion that the UN acts with force in Darfur.” (Open Democracy)
Five Reasons Not to Intervene In Syria (October 1, 2012)
Mali's Humanitarian Crisis May Worsen if Intervention Calls Heeded, UN Warned (September 27, 2012)
On the occasion of the UN 67th General Assembly, France, the US, and many other Western and African member States have called for military action in Mali. Since the coup of March 2012, North Mali which controlled by Tuareg rebel and al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb have increased its presence in the region. Yet, aid officials and experts of humanitarian affairs warn the UN that such intensification of the conflict would actually exacerbate the current food and nutrition crisis by displacing important part of the population. (The Guardian)
Mali: UN to Debate Military Intervention (September 25, 2012)
What America Knows How to Do Best (September 24, 2012)
Western media have given extensive coverage to United States military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, the US is involved in many other countries around the world, including Pakistan, Somalia, the Philippines, Central Africa, and Guatemala. In addition to direct military activities, drone strikes and proxy wars, the US is the world's top weapons exporter, with 78% of the global arms trade in 2011. Tom Englehardt argues that “when Washington sees a problem anywhere on the planet, its version of a "foreign policy" is often to call on the US military.” He concludes: "force is increasingly not [the] option of last resort, but [the] first choice." (Al Jazeera)
Despite Syria’s Bloodbath, Libya-Style Intervention Remains Unlikely (September 21, 2012)
Recent anti-US protests and the unstable lack of security that defines post-intervention Libya has “raised new questions about Libya as a model for intervention” according to Tony Karon. After 18 months of violence, the conflict can now best be described as a Lebanon-type inter-ethnic civil war. Hence, a military intervention would mean taking side with an opposition that remains deeply divided. This and the Libyan chaos will restrain Western powers, and specifically the US, when contemplating military operations in the country. (Time)
The Siren Song of American Imperialism (September 20, 2012)
From the invasion of the Philippines in 1908 to the recent mission in Libya, military interventions under humanitarian pretexts have always been at the cornerstone of US foreign policy. In this article, William Astore draws an interesting historical parallel between President Taft’s defense of the invasion of the Philippines more than a century ago and Presidents Bush and Obama’s rhetoric to justify wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Already a century ago, the US was presenting its intervention as a benevolent civilizing missions to bring “progress” to the Philippines ans “build” infrastructure, security forces apparatus, and education system. Astore concludes indeed that the “imperial rhetoric hasn't changed at all”. (Huffington Post)
Divided We Stand: Libya’s Enduring Conflicts (September 14, 2012)
On Monday September 11th, US Ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens was killed in the midst of anti-American protests in Benghazi. As the International Crisis Groups describes in its latest report, this is “a stark reminder of Libya’s security challenges.” The Security Council’s endorsed Western intervention left the country barely functioning. As a result, while local armed groups fighting for the control of resources are in charge of providing security in the country, the proliferation of weapons is threatening the whole Sahel region. Ultimately, the chaotic situation of Libya 18 months after the intervention reminds us that before calling for a similar military mandate in Syria, interventionists should carefully weights the potential longer term consequences with which Syrians would have to live once the last jet planes fly away. (International Crisis Group)
A Safe Haven Inside Syria? Bad Idea (September 1, 2012)
On Monday September 3rd, Syrian National Council leader Abdel Basset Sayda stirred up the debate on intervention in Syria: "We need a humanitarian intervention and we are asking for military intervention for the Syrian civilians." A few days earlier, Turkey has pleaded for an intermediary solution through the establishment of a militarily protected safe haven for refugees inside Syria. But would this be effective? Christopher Dickey sheds light on the uneven record of such strategy used in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1991 and Srebrenica in 1995. To him, safe havens “generally offer poor shelter, and often give probable cause for escalating violence.” He therefore denunciates Turkey’s latest initiative as a dangerous use of “humanitarian pretexts” and concludes that: “At best this is a cynical use of refugees as geopolitical pawns, at worst it’s a kind of humanitarian blackmail.” (The Daily Beast)
Brazil Hosts Workshop on "Responsibility While Protecting" (August 29, 2012)
On Wednesday September 5th, the UN General Assembly held a dialogue on the “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P). This concept, established at the UN in 2005, affirms that if a state fails to protect its citizens, the international community has the responsibility to act through coercive measures, military intervention being the last resort. Concretely, R2P was invoked in the Security Council’s resolution 1973 that authorized Western Powers to intervene in Libya in 2011. Yet, this has been highly controversial as they used their mandate to ensure a “no fly zone” to support regime change in Tripoli. It is for this reason that Brazil is currently promoting a new concept, the “Responsibility While Protecting” (RWP), which calls for greater accountability and “more rigorous criteria for the use of force and to limit the freedom of western powers once military operations are underway.” (Foreign Policy)
Migrant Boat Tragedy: NATO Condemned Over 63 Migrants Left to Die at Sea (April 11, 2012)
In Defence of "Iraq Syndrome": Liberal Values Never Drive Intervention (April 3, 2012)
Liberal support for military interventions by the West rests on the assumption that the West is essentially a benevolent force in the world. However, even a cursory survey of the US or UK’s foreign policy over the last decade would reveal that foreign policy decisions are not based in a desire for “freedom and democracy,” or even a desire to minimize suffering. This analysis has been branded in some sectors “Iraq Syndrome,” in the belief that the Iraq Conflict has encouraged a reluctance to support conflict, even for nominally humanitarian reasons. In this Guardian article David Wearing skewers this belief and makes a case for skepticism. (Guardian)
How to End Mass Atrocites (March 9, 2012)
As Calls for Intervention in Syria Grow, Vijay Prashad Urges Reevaluation of NATO Attack on Libya (February 21, 2012)
One Year On: Chaotic Libya Reveals the Perils of Humanitarian Intervention (February 19, 2012)
In this article Peter Beaumont argues that the aftermath of the Libyan intervention discredits the practice of humanitarian intervention as it currently stands. Instead, he argues, humanitarian intervention, and the corollary discourse of the “Responsibility to Protect,” should encompass longer-term plans to ensure stability, institution building, and peace. While Beaumont’s skepticism toward “regime change” style humanitarian intervention is completely appropriate, his belief in longer term occupation dressed up as capacity building is far too optimistic. (Guardian)
The Conest Over Peace and Security in Africa (February 6, 2012)
Africa expert Alex de Waal argues that foreign powers, in particular the US, UK, and France, dominate African conflicts, and that they have eclipsed traditional conflict resolution methods, discredited domestic in the eyes of citizens across Africa. Negotiated settlements between international power brokers take precedence over local political actors, who are increasingly excluded from peace processes and as such, damage African democracies and make lasting peace a less likely outcome. (AfricanArguements)
Displacement: Governments Falling Short on R2P, Says New Study (January 20, 2012)
Most discussion on the concept of the responsibility to protect (R2P) focuses on whether the “international community” should intervene to protect civilians under threat in any country. However, the 1st tenet of R2P, that governments have a responsibility to protect their own citizens, is less often discussed. This IRIN article examines the case of internally displaced people (IDPs), and how some states are failing to prevent displacement. But extending the scope of R2P to IDPs is problematic: does this mean that the “international community” should intervene in countries where governments are failing to protect the population against displacement? (IRIN News)
2011
Outside the Law (October 25, 2011)
Hey G.I. Joe – Welcome to Uganda but Don’t Slip on the Oil (October 16, 2011)
US Approves ‘Humanitarian Intervention' in Several African Countries (October 16, 2011)
Chapter VII: A Loophole for Imperialists? (September 6, 2011)
The Crisis of Humanitarian Intervention (August 5, 2011)
Humanitarian Intervention and its Non-Humanitarian Agenda (August 4, 2011)
Responsibility to Protect – The Cases of Libya and the Ivory Coast (May 15, 2011)
R2P is misused (May 5, 2011)
Responsibility to Protect or Right to Intervene? (April 12, 2011)
2009
Making War to Bring ‘Peace' (August 3, 2009)
U.S. Inaction Seen After Taliban P.O.W.'s Died (July 10, 2009)
Declaration by Church and Peace on the Concept of Responsibility to Protect (July 9, 2009)
Foreign Aid Goes Military! (July 9, 2009)
Are Wars Ever Just? (April 21, 2009)
The War on Yugoslavia, 10 Years Later (April 6, 2009)
R2P: Disciplining the Mice, Freeing the Lions (March 23, 2009)
Haiti and The Dangers of Responsibility to Protect (January 3, 2009)
2008
French Foreign Minister Voices Doubts on Human Rights Push (December 10, 2008)
Bipartisan US Panel Offers Blueprint to Prevent Genocide (December 8, 2008)
UN Special Advisor with a Focus on R2P Edward Luck's Statement on Conflict Resolution and Prevention in Africa (December 1, 2008)
Response to Gareth Evans' "The Responsibility to Protect: Holding the Line" (October 15, 2008)
The Responsibility to Protect: Holding the Line (October 6, 2008)
Spectacular Wrongs: Gary Bass's 'Freedom's Battle' (September 24, 2008)
The New Humanitarian Order (September 10, 2008)
Humanitarian Imperialism: The New Doctrine of Imperial Right (September 2008)
Responsible Sovereignty: International Cooperation for a Changed World (July 15, 2008)
The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention (June 12, 2008)
Riots Expose Canada's Haiti Adventure as Sham (May 21, 2008)
The Responsibility to Protect and Its Application to the Situation in Burma (May 9, 2008)
The R2P Controversy (March 2008)
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): A Way Forward – or Rather Part of the Problem? (February 2008)
This Zeal for Intervention is Imperialism in New Clothes (February 13, 2008)
Intervention, Hailed as a Concept, Is Shunned in Practice (January 20, 2008)
2007
Western Humanitarianism or Neo-Slavery? (November 7, 2007)
Humanitarian Advocacy in Darfur: The Challenge of Neutrality (October 2007)
The Dismantling of Yugoslavia (October 2007)
Responsibility to Protect: Moving the Campaign Forward (October 2007)
Bush's Napoleonic Folly (August 24, 2007)
Peacemaker or Puppet? (August 16- 22, 2007)
Humanitarian Wars and Associated Delusions (August 14, 2007)
An Atrocity That Needs No Exaggeration (August 12, 2007)
Harvard's Humanitarian Hawks (July 14, 2007)
The Schizophrenias of R2P (June 30, 2007)
Darfur Advocacy Group Undergoes a Shake-Up (June 2, 2007)
Where Anti-Arab Prejudice and Oil Make the Difference (May 29, 2007)
Will Iraq Be the Next Rwanda? (April 15, 2007)
A Fair Foreign Policy (April 2007)
No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention (March 21, 2007)
The Politics of Naming: Genocide, Civil War, Insurgency (March 9, 2007)
In Search of Symbiosis: The Security Council in the Humanitarian Domain (March 2007)
Introduction to "Selling US Wars" (March 2007)
Oil in Darfur? Special Ops in Somalia? (February 7, 2007)
2006
The Humanitarian War Myth (October 1, 2006)
Responsibility to Protect? (September 19, 2006)
Justice Unfettered? Internationalizing Justice in the Human Rights Era (July 2006)
A Just War? Hardly (May 9, 2006)
Declassifying Canada in Haiti (April 7, 2006)
Fragile Countries and United Nations Reform (February 23, 2006)
Humanitarian Intervention: Evolution of a Dangerous Doctrine (January 19, 2006)
2005
Legalized Imperialism": "Responsibility to Protect" and the Dubious Case of Haiti (December, 2005)
We Are in Iraq to Bring about Democracy (September 28, 2005)
A Road Towards Peace, Harmony, and Common Development (September 19, 2005)
Chavez Criticizes UN Reforms in Speech (September 17, 2005)
The New World Order (July 14, 2005)
Once Again (May 15, 2005)
An Idea Paul Wolfowitz and Kofi Annan Can Agree On (March 29, 2005)
Crime of Crimes (March 6, 2005)
2004
How Silent Are the Humanitarian Invaders of Kosovo? (December 8, 2004)
A UN for This Century, Not the Last One (December 3, 2004)
UN Panel Proposes New Criteria for Using Force (November 28, 2004)
UN Reform Pushed by Martin at APEC (November 21, 2004)
Enough Imperial Crusades (August 18, 2004)
Peter Hallward traces the crisis in Sudan back to previous US and UK involvement, arguing that any direct Anglo-US intervention today is merely the soft face of imperialism. He asserts "This is a political question before it is a moral or humanitarian one. Today's humanitarian crisis is precisely a result of past political failure." In lieu of western intervention, Hallward advocates western support for African Union-led efforts, stating "Anglo-US forces now have only one moral responsibility: to stay at home." (Guardian)
Reinventing US Foreign Aid at Millennium Challenge Corp. (August 10, 2004)
The US takes a new approach in foreign aid through the Millennium Challenge Corp. an enterprise combining Wall Street savvy and conservative ideology to regulate and monitor impoverished countries' use of US aid money. To receive foreign aid, countries must "qualify" in accordance to predetermined factors. (Washington Post)
When Intervention is Necessary, Who Can You Call? (August 5, 2004)
Can US power "be used for good in Africa or elsewhere in cases of mass killings or other crimes against humanity?" Acknowledging the harmful and destabilizing history of US intervention, particularly on the African continent, the author nonetheless argues that the scale of "genocide" in Darfur requires that United States lead a multilateral force to end the crisis. (Foreign Policy in Focus)
In Sudan Crisis, a Duty to Intervene? (July 21, 2004)
As the crisis in Sudan's Darfur region escalates, the question of a possible humanitarian intervention is gaining increasing urgency. Many argue that there is a moral imperative to act in such cases, but others avoid using the word "genocide" for fear of compelling intervention. Some advocates of intervention are engaging in civil disobedience and protests to pressure the US government to send troops. (Christian Science Monitor)
< Never Again, No Longer? (July 18, 2004)
Is humanitarian intervention "yesterday's problem?" The author of this essay fears that since 9/11 the West is more concerned with its own vulnerability than that of distant strangers, and that the US war on Iraq has "hopelessly muddied the waters on the legitimacy of intervention." Intervention must involve national interest, humanitarianism is irrelevant, and crises like the one in Darfur will likely continue uninterrupted. (New York Times)
No More Lawless Interventions (July 6, 2004)
This article argues that to avoid future cases of "rushed intervention" such as Iraq and "delayed intervention" such as Rwanda, the UN must adopt more precise criteria for international action against dangerous regimes. It proposes a refinement of the "valid but incomplete" criteria for humanitarian intervention put forward by British Prime Minister Tony Blair in a 1999 speech. (Guardian)
An Immense Charge: Realist Lessons about the Consequences of Intervention (May 26, 2004)
The article outlines several "lessons" to be learned from the history of recent interventions. Interventions "almost inevitably come too late," address "symptoms rather than underlying causes," and "can exacerbate, rather than reduce, the humanitarian crisis." (In the National Interest)
A Charter to Intervene: Human Rights Interventions Can Only Be Divorced from Imperialism with New UN Rules (March 23, 2004)
The author criticizes the weakness of current international law in allowing powerful nations to justify their controversial actions as humanitarian intervention. International law needs to develop a balance where permitting force would relieve the suffering of the oppressed people and not further the interests of powerful nations. (Guardian)
Blair's 'International Community' Doctrine (March 6, 2004)
Critics are concerned British Prime Minister Tony Blair's "international community" doctrine seeks to justify the US/UK war in Iraq, validates unilateral (i.e. non-UN sponsored) interventions, and offends the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter. (BBC)
Haiti: Dangerous Muddle (March 2004)
The author examines US "liberal interventions" in Kosovo and Haiti in 1994, and argues single-power interventions are both politically illegitimate and often lead to further political instability and crisis.
Annan Calls For Urgent Action, Even Military Intervention, to Prevent Genocide (January 26, 2004)
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has called for "strong and united political action and, in extreme cases,…military action" by states to combat acts of genocide. Annan said intervention to prevent genocide was not a "right to intervention," but at root a responsibility of the entire human race to protect fellow human beings from extreme abuse. (UN News Service)
War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention (January 2004)
US attempts to justify the Iraq war, even in part, in humanitarian terms risks giving humanitarian intervention a "bad name" and breeds cynicism about the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, argues Human Rights Watch.
The New Humanitarianism (December 2003/January 2004)
This major article looks thoughtfully and critically at humanitarian intervention. Reviewing the growing literature, the author concludes that the global economic order produces civil wars and failed states and elicits interventionist responses. Humanitarian interventions, he argues, maintain the unjust global order and obscure its negative consequences. Humanitarian agencies are complicit. (Boston Review)