Magisterial Lecture
on Security Council Reform
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mexico City, Mexico
4 March 1996
I would like to speak to you today on a subject that a Secretary-General is not supposed to address: Security Council reform.
As I do so, I am mindful of Mexico's distinguished contribution to the work of the Council. Mexico was elected to the Security Council in 1946, in the earliest stage of the Council's existence. Mexico's Permanent Representative at the time, Ambassador Luis Padilla Nervo -- a very distinguished diplomat who later became Foreign Minister -- considered that election as an acknowledgement of the pacific tradition of his country.
During its 1980 to 1981 term on the Council, Mexico gallantly accepted the burden of statesmanship at a difficult time. Mexico's Permanent Representative, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, served as Chairman of the Security Council Committee established in 1977 by resolution 421, concerning the question of the arms embargo against South Africa -- an issue to which I personally committed myself throughout my official career.
Today, Mexico continues to contribute through its recent proposal on Security Council reform, insisting on equitable geographic representation and on limiting veto rights.
Since January 1994, Security Council reform has been discussed in the General Assembly, in the open-ended working group on the question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and other Council-related matters.
I am totally committed to the sanctity of this process. It is not for a Secretary-General to evaluate, advocate or in any way express a position on the serious and important proposals put forward on Security Council reform.
Why, then, have I chosen to address this topic with you today? My purpose is to emphasize the importance of Security Council reform, to review briefly the character of the proposals under discussion, and to point out that Security Council reform is linked to the entire set of grave and urgent crises now facing the United Nations as an Organization.
Security Council reform is a critical issue of our time. It must be dealt with seriously, carefully and responsibly. It can be at the heart of a United Nations transformed into a truly effective system for the maintenance of international peace and security, now and into the future.
Since the beginning of this decade, the Security Council has become a far more active and effective decision-making body than it was during the cold war period. In recent years, the Council has met on an almost continuous basis. It deals with situations as they arise. It monitors the many peace operations on the basis of my reports. It adopts resolution after resolution to respond to changing requirements. To illustrate, in 1987, the Council met 49 times, adopted 14 resolutions and issued nine presidential statements. Last year, in 1995, the Council met 130 times, adopted 66 resolutions and issued 63 presidential statements.
Te Council has met to analyse threats to international peace and security, as in the case of Iraq; to call on antagonists to turn back from the threshold of violence, as in the case of Burundi; to take a range of actions to prevent, control and resolve conflicts, as in the case of preventive deployment in The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and to gather world support for its mandates, such as arms embargoes. It has undertaken fact- finding missions of its own, as in the case of Somalia. And it has established, as subsidiary organs, war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.
One of the Council's great recent achievements has been its careful and deliberate search for consensus within its own ranks. Council members have achieved a greater degree of harmony and cohesion in dealing with their agenda than was considered possible during the first four decades of the Council's existence.
But the same changes in the world scene that have led to increased and increasingly effective Security Council action also have given rise to new concerns about the Council. There is widespread agreement among Member States that the Council's present membership and composition do not reflect the realities of economic and political change, and are unrepresentative of the membership at large.
There also are concerns that the Council has been exceeding its mandate. Most of the conflicts now dealt with are not international, but internal, as in Somalia or Haiti. This raises questions of interference. The positive creation of multi-functional peace-keeping operations to deal with such conflicts, has generated a new set of non-military activities and budgetary questions, related to peace-keeping, which many feel justify a greater role for the General Assembly.
Finally, there is concern that the unprecedented scale of peace operations -- which, at one point, in December 1994, reached a total of 17 operations with nearly 70,000 troops deployed -- has drawn attention and resources away from the crucial demands of development.
Thus, it was inevitable, and today it is not only appropriate but desirable, that Member States are calling for change in the composition of the Council and in the way it will carry out its responsibilities. Security Council reform is essential in order to sustain the Council's authority, legitimacy and effectiveness. It is imperative if the United Nations is to deliver on its potential to apply an integrated approach -- covering political, security, economic and social dimensions -- to the complex challenges of this new era.
Article 23 of the United Nations Charter names the permanent members of the Security Council. That Article also empowers the General Assembly to elect non-permanent members of the Council. Article 27 outlines the rules for voting in the Council.
Both Articles were amended by act of the General Assembly on 17 December 1963. The amendments came into force on 31 August 1965. The amendment to Article 23 enlarged the membership of the Council from 11 to 15. And the amendment to Article 27 raised the number of affirmative votes needed for a decision -- including the concurring votes of the five permanent members -- from seven to nine.
This precedent tells us that the Charter can be amended to fit changing circumstances and new needs. It also tells us that such amendment is a matter entirely within the hands of the Member States themselves, acting through the General Assembly.
It is this precedent that provides inspiration and guidance to the General Assembly working group on Security Council reform.
I will not try to summarize each of the many proposals for reform made by individual Member States or groups of States. That would be inappropriate and indeed impossible in the time we have available today. Let me, instead, try to outline for you the various issues involved and where they stand at present.
There are four basic issues under consideration: to increase the permanent membership; to increase non-permanent membership only; to consider the number of affirmative votes needed for the Council to act -- the "action threshold"; and to enhance the working methods of the Security Council.
First, with regard to the permanent membership, there seems to be widespread recognition that Germany and Japan now number among the countries with the greatest capacity to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security -- the criterion for permanent membership envisioned by the founders. But today, the developing world is understandably reluctant to further increase the heavy imbalance of permanent members towards the northern industrialized world. Balancing these two elements -- capacity to contribute and geographical representation -- remains one of the principal challenges that reform proposals must overcome.
The debate over whether new permanent members should have the same rights as existing permanent members, including the veto, has been central. The creation of various new secondary classes of permanent membership have been proposed, but many countries have also taken the position that all permanent members -- new and old -- should have the same rights. While many proposals have argued for limiting or even abolishing veto rights for all permanent members, there remains no indication that any such proposals could obtain the necessary agreement of all of the existing permanent members.
The proposed solutions to this difficulty fall generally into broad categories, such as: to add new permanent members from the developing world in order to address the existing imbalance, and offset the possible addition of Germany and Japan as permanent members; or to allocate additional new non- permanent seats to developing countries, together with other measures intended to give the non-permanent seats more significance. Such measures could include allowing non-permanent members to be immediately re-elected, or raising the action threshold for Council decisions.
Second are proposals that would increase the non-permanent membership only. One recent line of thinking has been that, if agreement on permanent membership expansion cannot be reached now, expansion should take place in non-permanent seats only, for the time being.
Many proposals for non-permanent expansion involve some form of rotation system. Others would define a new set of regional groups: Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Middle East and Mahgreb, Africa, Central and South Asia, East Asia and Oceania, and the Americas. Mexico proposes that non- permanent membership be increased from 10 to 15. Of the five additional seats, one would go to Africa, one to Asia, one to Latin America, one to Western Europe and Other States -- to be alternated with Eastern Europe in two-year periods -- and one to rotate between Germany and Japan every two years. The permanent membership would remain unchanged.
Third is the issue of how many votes should be needed for the Council to act.
The present action threshold for the Council stands at 60 per cent. Decisions (except on procedural matters) require nine of 15 votes (and no negative votes by a permanent member). Raising the number of affirmative votes needed for the Council to act has been incorporated into some proposals as a means of enhancing the importance of the non-permanent seats. In this way, an effective "group veto" might be created for the developing world -- without placing that veto into the hands of any single State.
By greatly enhancing the strength and importance of the new non- permanent members, raising the threshold for Council action is seen by some as a key element of a new framework balancing the possible addition of Germany and Japan as permanent members with the imperative of making the Council more representative by strengthening the voice of the developing world.
Fourth are measures taken to enhance the transparency and working methods of the Security Council. Such steps do not require Charter amendment, and many have already been taken. These include:
These, then, are the four basic issues -- increasing permanent membership, increasing non-permanent membership, the "action threshold" and the Council's working methods. I have reviewed these issues to underline the continued importance of this effort at reform.
Without any doubt, the world has entered an unprecedented period in its history. Both peril and potential will mark the years ahead.
Participation in the work of the United Nations will be essential. All Member States should take the most positive view towards the accepted principles of participation and equity in the universal Organization that is the United Nations. That commitment to participation can be realized through a reformed system of Security Council membership and increasingly open and participatory working methods of the Security Council.
This will lead to greater legitimation for the work of the United Nations. Reforms in Council membership and working methods will create ideas, foster communications, improve coordination and gain wider acceptance for the decisions of the Organization. The immensely difficult tasks that lie ahead for the international community will require this wider and deeper foundation for common action.
And, in turn, these improvements will further the democratization of the international system itself. States in every part of the world are now aware that issues they once considered internal and subject to their policy decisions alone now are affected by vast forces of globalization. In this recognition, States simply will not, and should not, accept a situation in which global issues are dealt with by representatives of only a few of the wealthiest and most powerful States, acting often behind closed doors.
Participation, legitimation and democratization will be key to the common progress of the international community of States as we move into the next century. All three can be served by Security Council reform. And all three can be guiding principles in the wider reform effort, of which Security Council reform is one, integral element.
The Organization faces several major crises today. In addition to the structural problem of Security Council reform of which I have spoken, there is: the financial crisis caused by massive Member States arrears; the reform of the scale of assessments for Member States contributions; the budget crisis, in which the General Assembly requires me to cut $154 million more from a budget I have already cut to less than zero growth in real terms; and the administrative challenge of Secretariat streamlining -- a problem which I have been addressing since my first day in office.
Further effort will require decisions beyond those available to a Secretary-General alone -- decisions that only Member States can make. All these crises are interrelated. For example, some Member States may accept an increased assessment if changes are made in the membership of the Security Council. So each crisis needs to be considered in the context of the others.
Somehow the cycle of crisis now affecting the United Nations must be broken. It is important to work on all fronts. For this reason, the task of Security Council reform should not be allowed to lose momentum. After two years of serious effort, the problem of Council membership and voting procedures remains unsolved. It is imperative that Member States carry this effort forward.
The stakes are high. The outcome can be a United Nations prepared better than ever to work for its Member States towards building a better world.
